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RELIGION AND THE LAW
JULIUS H. MINER*
R ELIGIOUS freedom is one of the priceless possessions of
every American. His right to worship and commune with
his Maker, according to his own conscience, must remain free
from any form of molestation. This is implicit in the guar-
antees contained in the First and Fourteenth Amendments
of the Federal Constitution. It is the very essence of democ-
racy. Does this mean, however, that the Constitution confers
an absolute right to advocate and practice any doctrines no
matter how detrimental they may be-even those admittedly
anti-social-under the guise of religion? May one commit
frauds upon the public with impunity through the simple
device of cloaking such frauds in a religious garb? May one
attack others, heaping abuse and vilification upon them, in
the name of religion? May one rely upon religious beliefs as
a protection for acts otherwise deemed criminal? Are pro-
fessed religious beliefs paramount to the law of the land? In
short, could democracy survive if the individual abuse of
any of the guaranteed freedoms were beyond the law's
control?
Religion is commonly accepted as a system of faith and
worship embracing the fundamentals of justice and right-
eousness. It prescribes a pattern of conduct for life; it fixes
mankind's duty toward God and man. It may take a vari-
ety of forms, but intrinsically it remains the same. Its
primary purpose is to perpetuate those spiritual ideals upon
which our modern civilization is founded. Because many
forms of religion are practiced in our land, it is vital for
their common good that we judge them with mutual fair-
ness. There will, of course, always be honest disagreement
between those who profess faith in these varied forms of
religion. Such contrary beliefs as do exist might be expressed
in strong language, but unrestrained vituperation and mali-
cious offense are foreign to any valid religion.' Such acts
Judge, Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois.
1 It was Voltaire who said: "On the whole we must repeat the often repeated
saying that it is unworthy for a religious man to view an irreligious one either
with alarm or aversion; or with any other feeling than regret, and hope and
brotherly commiseration."
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threaten the very survival of religious liberty, and, as reli-
gious liberty inspires political freedom, they strike at the
very foundations of democracy.
Despite this, in recent years numerous self-styled reli-
gious cults have sprung up. Many of these cults, seeking to
spread their own doctrines, resort to the contemptible device
of arousing prejudice against other recognized religious
denominations. They condemn large segments of our popu-
lation by accusations hurled at racial or religious groups.
Some of them appeal to the ignorant and illiterate by
"ordaining" as ministers of the gospel every one who joins
their group, without regard for any recognized qualifica-
tion. By this "ordination" they promote the sale of question-
able, even defamatory, literature at huge profits. To finance
their operations, they solicit funds for "religious" purposes.
Religious liberty, to them, becomes the cloak of intolerance.
Tolerance is the inseparable companion of freedom of
worship. It grants equal liberty to all faiths and to all
denominations. A nation in which such liberties are not fully
protected is not free. Artificial incitement to religious preju-
dices, then, becomes democracy's real and immediate men-
ace. We are learning daily, and it is hoped not too late, the
tragic truth that wherever intolerance is fomented it will
soon provoke political unrest and the loss of all freedoms. A
forest fire intended to remove only the brush, unless well
controlled, burns the elms, the oaks, the pines and the
maples. The question then becomes whether or not such
controls may be imposed to eradicate intolerance without
destroying religious freedom itself.
The First Amendment to the Federal Constitution is a
mandate to Congress to "make no law respecting an estab-
lishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof;
or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or of
the right of the people peaceably to assemble." Here, as in
practically every state constitution, liberty of conscience is
accorded equal dignity with freedom of speech and of the
press. Since these three freedoms are contained in the
identical constitutional provision, should they not then all be
equally subject to reasonable governmental regulation?
There are persons who claim that religious liberty should be
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subject to no restraint whatever. Analogy may help estab-
lish that this is, and should be, untrue.
RESTRAINTS UPON A FREE PRESS
The importance of guarding the essential liberty of the
press against every form of invasion is self-evident. It is
interwoven into the political and social fabric of this country
quite as much as is religious freedom. Courts are quick to
check every unreasonable interference. Still, we accept it as
axiomatic that such freedom is not absolute, and, when it
passes beyond the reasonable bounds marked by the law, it
becomes subject to proper controls.
Blackstone tells us that the liberty of the press "consists
in laying no previous restraints upon publications, and not in
freedom from censure for criminal matter when pub-
lished." 2 While this limited doctrine prevented govern-
mental interference by censorship or injunction before the
words were printed, it encouraged arbitrary restrictive
legislation defining "legal" utterances and providing severe
punishment, after the publication, of prohibited matter.
Under written constitutions, we have found this view to
be too narrow. Professor Cooley rejected that theory,
declaring that liberty of the press would be rendered a
mockery if public authorities might punish for harmless pub-
lications. The purpose of the constitutional provision, he
stated, had been to
protect parties in the free publication of matters of public concern,
to secure their right to a free discussion of public events and public
measures, and to enable every citizen at any time to bring the
government and any person in authority to the bar of public opinion
by any just criticism upon their conduct in the exercise of the author-
ity which the people have conferred upon them.3
It should be noted that Cooley places an important limitation
upon this right, i.e. that the criticism be "just."
His thought was applied, in 1900, by Judge Hamersley
who declined to accept a policy of unrestricted constitutional
protection for either tongue or pen. He said:
Every citizen has an equal right to use his mental endowments, as
well as his property, in any harmless occupation or manner; but he
3 Cooley, Const. Lim., 8th Ed., I, 885.2 4 BI. Com. 151.
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has no right to use them so as to injure his fellow citizens or to en-
danger the vital interests of society. Immunity in the mischievous use
is as inconsistent with civil liberty as prohibition of the harmless
use . . . The liberty protected is not the right to perpetrate acts
of licentiousness, or any act inconsistent with the peace or safety of
the state. Freedom of speech and press does not include the abuse of
the power of tongue or pen, any more than freedom of other action
includes an injurious use of one's occupation, business or property. 4
Eighteen years later, Chief Justice White gave expression
to the principle that freedom of the press is not to be
regarded as a license to do wrong, any more than it implies
the right to interfere with those duties of the government
upon which depend the freedom of all, including that of the
press. Said he: ". . . however complete is the right of the
press to state public things and discuss them, that right, as
every other right, enjoyed in human society, is subject to the
restraints which separate right from wrong-doing.'' 5
Again, in 1941, the Supreme Court of the United States
emphatically asserted that "utterance in a context of vio-
lence can lose its significance as an appeal to reason and
become part of an instrument of force. Such utterance was
not meant to be sheltered by the Constitution." 6  It insisted
that civil liberties, as guaranteed by the Constitution, "imply
the existence of an organized society maintaining public
order without which liberty itself would be lost in the
excesses of unrestrained abuses." 7 The thought was aptly
expressed by our own Supreme Court when it declared that
"freedom of speech does not include freedom to libel or
slander. There is no theory upon which the constitution can
be shaped into a mantle for wrong. "8
One of the leading American cases on constitutional free-
dom of speech, that of Gitlow v. New York, elaborated upon
the necessity for the exercise of restraint in its use, by
stating:
4 State v. McKee, 73 Conn. 18 at 28, 46 A. 409 at 413 (1900).
5 Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States, 247 U. S. 402 at 419, 38 S. Ct. 560,
62 L. Ed. 1186 at 1193 (1918).
6 Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, 312 U. S. 287 at 293, 61
S. Ct. 552, 85 L. Ed. 836 at 841 (1941).
7 Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U. S. 569 at 574, 61 S. Ct. 762, 85 L. Ed. 1049 at
1052 (1941).
8 Swing v. American Federation of Labor, 372 Ill. 91 at 96, 22 N. E. (2d) 857
at 859 (1939).
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It is a fundamental principle, long established, that the freedom of
speech and of the press which is secured by the Constitution does
not confer an absolute right to speak or publish, without responsibility,
whatever one may choose, or an unrestricted and unbridled license
that gives immunity for every possible use of language, and prevents
the punishment of those who abuse this freedom . . . Reasonably
limited . . . this freedom is an inestimable privilege in a free gov-
ernment; without such limitation, it might become the scourge of the
Republic.
That a state, in the exercise of its police power, may punish those
who abuse this freedom by utterances inimical to the public welfare,
tending to corrupt public morals, incite to crime, or disturb the public
peace, is not open to question. 9
This idea was followed in Near v. Minnesota, where the
court stated that: "Every freeman has an undoubted right to
lay what sentiments he pleases before the public; to forbid
this, is to destroy the freedom of the press; but if he pub-
lishes what is improper, mischievous or illegal, he must
take the consequence of his own temerity."' 10
There are, in addition, many decisions of the United
States Supreme Court which pass upon the constitutional
right to freedom of expression as affected by laws dealing
with espionage, 1 the selective draft, 2  and sedition. 13 In
that connection, when defining the emergency war-time
powers of Congress, Mr. Justice Holmes declared, in
Schenck v. United States, that:
9 268 U. S. 652 at 666, 45 S. Ct. 625, 69 L. Ed. 1138 at 1145 (1925). The doctrine
that the Fourteenth Amendment safeguards freedom of expression against state
legislation is now definitely established. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697,
51 S. Ct. 625, 75 L. Ed. 1357 (1931); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U. S. 568,
62 S. Ct. 766, 86 L. Ed. 1031 (1942). It was Mr. Justice Sanford, however, who
first pronounced, in the Gitlow case, that "freedom of speech and of the press-
which are protected by the First Amendment from abridgement by Congress-
are among the fundamental personal rights and 'liberties' protected by the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by the States."
10 283 U. S. 697 at 713, 51 S. Ct. 625, 75 L. Ed. 1357 at 1366 (1931).
11 Schenck v. United States, 249 U. S. 47, 39 S. Ct. 247, 63 L. Ed. 470 (1919);
Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U. S. 204, 39 S. Ct. 249, 63 L. Ed. 561 (1919);
Debs v. United States, 249 U. S. 211, 39 S. Ct. 252, 63 L. Ed. 566 (1919); Abrams
v. United States, 250 U. S. 616, 40 S. Ct. 17, 63 L. Ed. 1173 (1919); Schaefer v.
United States, 251 U. S. 466, 40 S. Ct. 259, 64 L. Ed. 360 (1920); Pierce v. United
States, 252 U. S. 239, 40 S. Ct. 205, 64 L. Ed. 542 (1920); Berger v. United States,
255 U. S. 22, 41 S. Ct. 230, 65 L. Ed. 481 (1921); and Masses Pub. Co. v. Patten,
244 F. 535 (1917), reversed in 245 F. 102 (1917).
12 Arver v. United States, 245 U. S. 366, 38 S. Ct. 159, 62 L. Ed. 349 (1918).
13 Stromberg v. California, 283 U. S. 359, 51 S. Ct. 532, 75 L. Ed. 1117 (1931);
United States v. Macintosh, 283 U. S. 605, 51 S. Ct. 570, 75 L. Ed. 1302 (1931).
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The question in every case is whether the words used are used in
such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear
and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils
that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity
and degree.
14
Substantially the same "clear and present danger" test was
followed when sustaining convictions on statutes prohibiting
anarchy, 5 and syndicalism. 6
There may also be found decisions of the Supreme Court
of the United States justifying the exclusion of obscene litera-
ture, illegal lottery prospectuses, prizefight films, and
various fraudulent schemes from the United States mails.
17
These cases hold that there is broad ground for the implica-
tion that the Federal government possesses police power
over such subjects, and that no privilege accorded by the
constitution may be exercised in such a way as to defeat any
one or more of the five great purposes for which the Federal
Constitution itself was ordained as described in the preamble
thereof. Such a police power is essential to prevent a failure
of government, the endangering of the general welfare, and
the weakening of the bonds of the union itself.'8
As a single example, the court, in Knowles v. United
States,'9 upholding the exclusion of an "obscene" weekly
paper called "The Lantern" from the mails, held that such
constitutional guarantees cannot be made a shield for the
violation of criminal laws since the latter are not designed to
restrict religious worship or a free press, but rather to pro-
tect society against practices that are clearly immoral and
14 249 U. S. 47 at 52, 39 S. Ct. 247, 63 L. Ed. 470 at 473.
15 Turner v. Williams, 194 U. S. 279, 24 S. Ct. 719, 48 L. Ed. 979 (1904); Gitlow
v. New York, 268 U. S. 652, 45 S. Ct. 625, 69 L. Ed. 1138 (1925); and Herndon v.
Lowry, 301 U. S. 242, 57 S. Ct. 732, 81 L. Ed. 1066 (1937).
16 Whitney v. California, 274 U. S. 357, 47 S. Ct. 641, 71 L. Ed. 1095 (1927);
Burns v. United States, 274 U. S. 328, 47 S. Ct. 650, 71 L. Ed. 1077 (1927); Fiske
v. Kansas, 274 U. S. 380, 47 S. Ct. 655, 71 L. Ed. 1108 (1927); and DeJonge v.
Oregon, 299 U. S. 353, 57 S. Ct. 255, 81 L. Ed. 278 (1937).
17 In re Jackson, 96 U. S. 727, 24 L. Ed. 877 (1878); Ex parte Rapier, 143 U. S.
110, 12 S. Ct. 374, 36 L. Ed. 93 (1892); Public Clearing House v. Coyne, 194 U. S.
497, 24 S. Ct. 789, 48 L. Ed. 1092 (1904); and United States ex rel. Milwaukee S. D.
Pub. Co. v. Burleson, 255 U. S. 407, 41 S. Ct. 352, 65 L. Ed. 704 (1921).
18 The very recent banning of such publications from the United States mails,
because of being engaged in a "sustained and systematic attack on certain of
our activities directly related to the war, as well as upon public morale gen-
erally," indicates clearly the attitude of our government in respect to controlling
utterances inimical to the public welfare. See United States v. Pelley, 132 F. (2d)
170 (1Q42). 19 170 F. 409 (1909).
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corrupting. 20 It is perfectly clear, then, from these authori-
ties that the First Amendment was not intended to give
immunity for every possible use of language. It may be
added that long before our courts expressed themselves on
the question, almost all of the states in the union had inserted
provisions in their respective constitutions to the effect that
while all persons may freely speak, write and publish on all
subjects, they may be held responsible for the abuse of that
liberty.
21
RESTRAINTS UPON THE FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION
The guarantee of liberty of expression is identical as to
all subjects of expression, including that of religion. Presum-
ably, therefore, responsibility for any abuse thereof will
attach identically to all subjects, including religion. Is such
the case? Though the First Amendment forbids Congress
from making any law "prohibiting the free exercise" of
religion, our federal courts have long maintained that rea-
sonable restrictions upon religious practices are permis-
sible; in fact, are even essential for the preservation of
liberty itself.
As far back as 1890, in Davis v. Beason, the court pointed
out that:
However free the exercise of religion may be, it must be subordinate
to the criminal laws of the country, passed with reference to actions
regarded by general consent as properly the subjects of punitive legis-
lation . . . It is assumed by counsel of the petitioner. that, because
no mode of worship can be established or religious tenets enforced
in this country, therefore any form of worship may be followed and
any tenets, however destructive of society, may be held and advocated,
if asserted to be a part of the religious doctrines of those advocating
and practicing them. But nothing is further from the truth. Whilst
legislation for the establishment of a religion is forbidden, and its
free exercise permitted, it does not follow that everything which may
be so called can be tolerated. Crime is not the less odious because
sanctioned by what any particular sect may designate as religion. 2
The same principle was considered, in Reynolds v.
United States, on the question of whether or not a person's
religious beliefs can be accepted as a justification for his
20 See also Swearingen v. United States, 161 U. S. 446, 16 S. Ct. 562, 40 L. Ed.
765 (1896).
21 See, for example, Ill. Const. 1870, Art. II, 6 4.
22 133 U. S. 333 at 343, 10 S. Ct. 299, 33 L. Ed. 637 at 640 (1890).
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committing an overt act made criminal by the law of the
land. In that respect the court said:
Laws are made for the government of actions, and while they can-
not interfere with mere religious belief and opinions, they may with
practices. Suppose one believed that human sacrifices were a neces-
sary part of religious worship, would it be seriously contended that
the civil government under which he lived could not interfere to pre-
vent a sacrifice? Or if a wife religiously believed it was her duty to
burn herself upon the funeral pile of her dead husband, would it be
beyond the power of the civil government to prevent her carrying
her belief into practice? . . . To permit this would be to make the
professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of the land,
and in effect to permit every citizen to become a law unto himself.
Government could exist only in name under such circumstances.
23
Almost identical reasoning was followed in Coleman v.
City of Griffin, in which the court stated that:
Religious liberty does not include the right to introduce and carry
out every scheme or purpose which persons see fit to claim as a
part of their religious system. No one can stretch his liberty so as to
interfere with that of his neighbor, or violate police regulations or
the penal laws of the land, enacted for the good order and general
welfare of all the people. Liberty founded by the fathers was not
license unrestrained by law.
2 4
The Flag Salute decision, upholding the right to expel
youths from the public schools because of refusal to yield to
the compulsion of a law which, it was claimed, was contrary
to religious convictions, has served to re-emphasize the
determination to subject alleged religious practices to rea-
sonable regulations. The court there said:
Conscientious scruples have not, in the course of the long struggle
for religious toleration, relieved the individual from obedience to a
general law not aimed at the promotion or restriction of religious be-
liefs. The mere possession of religious convictions which contradict
the relevant concerns of a political society does not relieve the citi-
zen from the discharge of political responsibilities. The necessity for
this adjustment has again and again been recognized. In a number
of situations the exertion of political authority has been sustained,
while basic considerations of religious freedom have been left invio-
late . . . In all these cases the general laws in question, upheld in
23 98 U. S. 145 at 166, 25 L. Ed. 244 at 250 (1879). See also Late Corporation
of Latter-Day Saints v. United States, 136 U. S. 1, 10 S. Ct. 792, 34 L. Ed. 478
(1890), in which the court recognized a right to prohibit polygamy, or other
offenses against the enlightened sentiment of mankind, notwithstanding the pre-
tence of religious conviction under which they may be advocated or practiced.
24 55 Ga. App. 123 at 128, 189 S. E. 427 at 430 (1936).
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their application to those who refused obedience from religious con-
viction, were manifestations of specific powers of government deemed
by the legislature essential to secure and maintain that orderly, tran-
quil, and free society without which religious toleration itself is unat-
tainable.
25
Particularly pertinent to this discussion is the following
statement by Professor Carl Zollman:
One other inherent limitation of the term religious liberty must be
noticed. The rights of one denomination end where those of another
begin. Any other arrangement would inevitably lead to a preference
of one denomination over another and would "end in simple intoler-
ance of all not in accord with the sentiments of the particular sect."
The religious rights of any person can not therefore "be so extended
as to interfere with the exercise of similar rights by other persons."
The individual holds his religious faith and all his ideas, notions and
preferences in reasonable subserviency to the equal rights of others
and to the paramount interest of the public....
It will now be clear that the relation between law and religion is very
simple. The greatest and freest scope is allowed to religious practices
which are only checked where they come into conflict with the public
peace or the rights of others, in short, with the obligations of good
citizenship. The law however is and remains supreme in every case.
"The decrees of a council or the decision of the Ulema are alike
powerless before its will. It acknowledges no government external to
itself.'"26
In much the same way, the state courts have upheld
laws which place qualification upon the unlimited exercise of
religious freedom. Thus the Supreme Court of Colorado had
before it the question of the constitutionality of a statute
requiring those engaged in the business of curing the sick to
possess certain qualifications and providing that "nothing in
the act shall be construed to prohibit the practice of the
religious tenets or the general belief of any church whatso-
ever, not prescribing medicine. ' 27 The court held that this
statute did not authorize one, under the cover of religion or a
religious exercise, to go into healing commercially for hire,
25 Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U. S. 586 at 594, 60 S. Ct. 1010, 84
L. Ed. 1375 at 1379 (1940). The case has been severely criticized by defenders of
civil liberties throughout the nation, and three of the justices therein have since
admitted a change of mind. See dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Black, con-
curred in by Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice Murphy, in Jones v. Opelika,
316 U. S. 584 at 623, 62 S. Ct. 1231, 86 L. Ed. 1691 at 1715 (1942).
26 Zollman, "Religious Liberty in the American Law," Selected Essays on
Const. Law, Vol. 2, 1108 at 1120.
27 Colo. Rev. Stats. 1908, Ch. 127, § 6069.
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using prayer as the curative agency or treatment, since
''religion cannot be used as a shield to cover a business
undertaking. ' 2 It has been held, however, that a statute
making it unlawful to practice medicine without a license
does not include the giving of treatment by the system known
as "Christian Science.
29
The conviction for vagrancy of an "ordained minister"
in a National Astrological Society, under a statute which
prohibited fortune telling, was sustained in Washington."
The court overruled the defense that the principles of reli-
gion as laid down by that society included the practice of
casting and reading horoscopes, and held that although reli-
gious beliefs and opinions may not be interfered with, harm-
ful "practices" may be prohibited.
Liberty of religion, like liberty of the press, is also
qualified in practically all of the state constitutions in that
its exercise may not excuse acts of licentiousness, or justify
practices inconsistent with the peace or safety of the state.
Such a restriction3 was first adopted in Illinois in 1870. The
state constitutions of 1818 and 1848 were silent on the subject.
The presence of such a provision clearly indicates the trend
of thought among the Illinois delegates at that 1870 Conven-
tion and reveals their apprehension that religious differ-
ences, when carried to extremes, might incite riots and dis-
turb the peace of the people. Their fears have been borne out
by the numerous and frequent disturbances occurring in
various localities throughout the nation from such activities.
RESTRAINTS ON THE DISTRIBUTION OF RELIGIOUS LITERATURE
Efforts to prevent such disturbances, without directly
imposing restraint upon the free exercise of religious beliefs,
have led to the enactment of statutes and ordinances seek-
ing to regulate the distribution and sale of "religious" litera-
ture. Many of these have been successfully challenged on
constitutional grounds. But the most common among them,
the "handbill" or "peddler's" ordinance requiring the pro-
28 Smith v. People, 51 Colo. 270 at 277, 117 P. 612 at 615 (1911).
29 State v. Mylod, 20 R. I. 632, 40 A. 753 (1898); Kansas City v. Baird, 92 Mo.
App. 204 (1902). See also annotation in 41 L.R.A. 428.
80 State v. Neitzel, 69 Wash. 567, 125 P. 939 (1912).
81 Ill. Const. 1870, Art. II, § 3.
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curement or purchase of a license or permit by the vendor or
distributor, has been sustained.8 2 The purpose of such legis-
lation is generally said to be either that of preventing the
littering of public highways with advertising circulars, or to
assure the safety and convenience in the use of the streets,
or to raise revenue.
The constitutionality of legislation of this nature has
been challenged, principally by religious groups, as abridg-
ing freedom of the press and of religious worship. When so
challenging, such groups apply terms such as "previous
restraint," "too broad," "censorship," "license," "discrimi-
nations," "vagueness," "lack of constitutional authority,"
and the like.3 3 In Lovell v. Griffin, the most frequently
quoted case on this subject, Chief Justice Hughes spoke for a
unanimous court, saying:
We think that the ordinance is invalid on its face. Whatever the motive
which induced its adoption, its character is such that it strikes at
the very foundation of the freedom of the press by subjecting it to
license and censorship. The struggle for the freedom of the press
was primarily directed against the power of the licensor . . . And
the liberty of the press became initially a right to publish "without
a license what formerly could be published only with one." While this
freedom from previous restraint upon publication cannot be regarded
as exhausting the guaranty of liberty, the prevention of that restraint
32 Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U. S. 444, 58 S. Ct. 666, 82 L. Ed. 949 (1938);
Village of South Holland v. Stein, 373 Ill. 472, 26 N. E. (2d) 868 (1940).
3 Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U. S. 233, 56 S. Ct. 444, 80 L. Ed. 660
(1936); Lovell V. City of Griffin, 303 U. S. 444, 58 S. Ct. 666, 82 L. Ed. 949 (1938);
Schneider v. Irvington, 308 U. S. 147, 60 S. Ct. 146, 84 L. Ed. 155 (1939); Cox v.
New Hampshire, 312 U. S. 569, 61 S. Ct. 762, 85 L. Ed. 1049 (1941); Jones v. City
of Opelika, 241 Ala. 279, 3 So. (2d) 76 (1941), affirmed 316 U. S. 584, 62 S. Ct. 1231,
86 L. Ed. 1691 (1942); Zimmerman v. Village of London, Ohio, 38 F. Supp. 582
(1941); Kennedy v. City of Moscow, 39 F. Supp. 26 (1941); Hannan v. City of
Haverhill, 120 F. (2d) 87 (1941); Cook v. City of Harrison, 180 Ark. 546, 21 S. W.
(2d) 966 (1929); State v. Russell, 146 Fla. 539, 1 So. (2d) 569 (1941); Coleman v.
City of Griffin, 55 Ga. App. 123, 189 S. E. 427 (1936); Thomas v. City of Atlanta,
59 Ga. App. 520, 1 S. E. (2d) 598 (1939); City of Litchfield v. Thorworth, 337
Ill. 469, 169 N. E. 265 (1929); City of Chicago v. Rhine, 363 Ill. 619, 2 N. E. (2d)
905 (1936); Village of South Holland v. Stein, 373 Ill. 472, 26 N. E. (2d) 868 (1940);
City of Blue Island v. Kozul, 379 Ill. 511, 41 N. E. (2d) 515 (1942); State v, Free-
man, 143 Kan. 315, 55 P. (2d) 362 (1936); Commonwealth v. Davis, 162 Mass. 510,
39 N. E. 113 (1895); Herder v. Shahadi, 125 N. J. L. 153, 14 A. (2d) 475 (1940);
People v. Banks, 6 N. Y. S. (2d) 41 (1938); State v. Babst, 104 Ohio St. 167, 135
N. E. 525 (1922); City of Cincinnati v. Mosier, 61 Ohio App. 81, 22 N. E. (2d) 418
(1939); City of Pittsburgh v. Ruffner, 134 Pa. Super. 192, 4 A. (2d) 224 (1939);
Commonwealth v. Reid, 144 Pa. Super. 569, 20 A. (2d) 841 (1941); State v. Mere-
dith, 197 S. C. 351, 15 S. E. (2d) 678 (1941); and State v. Greaves, 112 Vt. 222, 22
A. (2d) 497 (1941).
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was a leading purpose in the adoption of the constitutional provision.
The liberty of the press is not confined to newspapers and periodi-
cals. It necessarily embraces pamphlets and leaflets. These indeed
have been historic weapons in the defense of liberty, as the pamph-
lets of Thomas Paine and others in our own history abundantly attest.
The press in its historic connotation comprehends every sort of pub-
lication which affords a vehicle of information and opinion ...
The ordinance cannot be saved because it relates to distribution and
not to publication. "Liberty of circulating is as essential to that free-
dom as liberty of publishing; indeed, without the circulation, the pub-
lication would be of little value."
'3 4
But the Lovell case and similar decisions have since
been distinguished. 5 They are fully analyzed in Cox v. New
Hampshire, where the court said:
The decisions upon which appellants rely are not applicable. In Lovell
v. Griffin . . . the ordinance prohibited the distribution of literature
of any kind at any time, at any place, and in any manner without
a permit from the city manager, thus striking at the very founda-
tion of the freedom of the press by subjecting it to license and cen-
sorship. In Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization . . . the
ordinance dealt with the exercise of the right of assembly for the
purpose of communicating views; it did not make comfort or conveni-
ence in the use of streets the standard of official action but enabled
the local official absolutely to refuse a permit on his mere opinion
that such refusal would prevent "riots, disturbances or disorderly as-
semblage." The ordinance thus created, as the record disclosed, an
instrument of arbitrary suppression of opinions on public questions.
The court said that "uncontrolled official suppression of the privilege
cannot be made a substitute for the duty to maintain order in con-
nection with the exercise of the right." In Schneider v. Irvington
. . . the ordinance was directed at canvassing and banned unlicensed
communication of any views, or the advocacy of any cause, from
door to door, subject only to the power of a police officer to determine
as a censor what literature might be distributed and who might dis-
tribute it. In Cantwell v. Connecticut . . . the statute dealt with the
solicitation of funds for religious causes and authorized an official to
determine whether the cause was a religious one and to refuse a
permit if he determined it was not, thus establishing a censorship of
religion .... 6
It, therefore, found that the ordinance therein involved
84 303 U. S. 444 at 451, 58 S. Ct. 666, 82 L. Ed. 949 at 953.
85 Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U. S. 569, 61 S. Ct. 762, 85 L. Ed. 1049 (1941);
Jones v. Opelika, 316 U. S. 584, 62 S. Ct. 1231, 86 L. Ed. 1691 (1942); and Bevins
v. Prindable, 39 F. Supp. 708 (1941), affirmed in 314 U. S. 573, 62 S. Ct. 116, 86
L. Ed. 465 (1941). 36 312 U. S. 569 at 577, 61 S. Ct. 762, 85 L. Ed. 1049 at 1054.
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was not improper since no interference with religious wor-
ship or the practice of religion in any proper sense was
shown. The ordinance rather only provided for the exercise
of local control over the use of streets for parades and
processions.
These same cases were again and more recently re-ap-
praised in Jones v. Opelika.7 The United States Supreme
Court there held that the right to determine the time, place
and manner for the diffusion of knowledge or for the prac-
tice of religion did not rest entirely with the proponents or
with the civil authorities. The determination of such limita-
tions, the court said, "rests with the legislative bodies, the
courts, the executive and the people themselves guided by
the experience of the past, the needs of revenue for law
enforcement, the requirements and capacities of police
protection, the dangers of disorder and other pertinent
factors. "38 The court noted the distinction between
non-discriminatory regulation of operations which are
incidental to the exercise of free speech, press or reli-
gion and those which are imposed upon the religious rite
itself or the unmixed dissemination of information. It held
that when teachers and preachers choose to utilize the vend-
ing of their religious books and tracts as a source of funds,
the financial aspects of their transactions need not be wholly
disregarded. On that score the court said:
When proponents of religious or social theories use the ordinary com-
mercial methods of sales of articles to raise propaganda funds, it is a
natural and proper exercise of the power of the state to charge rea-
sonable fees for the privilege of canvassing. Careful as we may and
should be to protect the freedoms safeguarded by the Bill of Rights,
it is difficult to see in such enactments a shadow of prohibition of
the exercise of religion or of abridgement of the freedom of speech
or the press. It is prohibition and unjustifiable abridgement which
are interdicted, not taxation.8 9
It is to be regretted that, after having established an out-
standing record for rejecting legislative encroachments upon
basic human rights, the Supreme Court should have let down
the bars in the Opelika case by declaring, in substance, that
37 316 U. S. 584, 62 S. Ct. 1231, 86 L. Ed. 1691 (1942).
88 316 U. S. 584 at 595, 62 S. Ct. 1231, 86 L. Ed. 1691 at 1700.
89 316 U. S. 584 at 596, 62 S. Ct. 1231, 86 L. Ed. 1691 at 1701.
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the exercise of religious freedom may be circumscribed, in
the guise of taxation, to methods, times and places that are
not in conflict with the preservation of peace and good order.
By so doing, the court has conceived a dangerous vehicle
that might be used to destroy freedom of worship. It is hoped
that it will soon re-examine such limitations in the light of
their true relation to the American philosophy of govern-
ment.40
THE TRUE BASIS OF RESTRAINT
Where publications are scurrilous, profane, obscene, or
are devoted to violent assaults upon the religious beliefs of
others, legislative intervention finds sanction in practically
all our courts. Such penal laws are not intended to prohibit
publication, but to protect citizens. Hence, our courts have
generally recognized that those who abuse the right of free
expression are responsible, both criminally to the public and
civilly for any private wrong." They have sustained such
legislation on the theory that the prohibition of use of obscene
and indecent literature cannot be and never was regarded as
an unreasonable exercise of police powers of the state and is
not, therefore, contrary to the Constitution of the United
States.42
One of America's outstanding authorities on consti-
40 The United States Supreme Court granted a rehearing in Jones v. Opelika
on February 15, 1943: see 11 U. S. Law Week 3252. The state court conception
of the ordinance involved in that case is best illustrated by the following quota-
tion from City of Manchester v. Leiby, 117 F. (2d) 661 (1941): "Under the Na-
tional Prohibition Act . . . the use of sacramental wine was subject to regulation
and permit . . . The regulations were no doubt applicable even to persons who
might have believed it a gross impiety to apply for a civil permit before par-
taking of a divine sacrament. Similarly, as to the sacrament of marriage-one
must get a marriage license from the civil authority, and in some states a brief
waiting period is mandatory after the license is issued. These may be regarded
as instances of rendering unto Caesar the things which are Caesar's...." The
state court, in the Opelika case, adopted such quotation as a part of its opinion:
241 Ala. 279 at 282, 3 So. (2d) 76 at 79 (1941).
41 Near v. Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697, 51 S. Ct. 625, 75 L. Ed. 1357 (1931).
42 Gitlow v. New York. 268 U. S. 652. 45 S. Ct. 625, 69 L. Ed. 1138 (1925);
Whitney v. California, 274 U. S. 357, 47 S. Ct. 641, 71 L. Ed. 1095 (1927); Cantwell
v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 60 S. Ct. 900, 84 L. Ed. 1213 (1940); Chaplinsky v.
New Hampshire, 315 U. S. 568, 62 S. Ct. 766, 86 L. Ed. 1031 (1942); Knowles v.
United States, 170 F. 409 (1909); Watch Tower Bible & Tract Soc. v. City of
Bristol, 24 F. Supp. 57 (1938), affirmed in 305 U. S. 572, 59 S. Ct. 246, 83 L. Ed.
361 (1938); Bevins v. Prindable, 39 F. Supp. 708 (1941), affirmed in 314 U. S. 573,
62 S. Ct. 116, 86 L. Ed. 465 (1941); Block v. City of Chicago, 239 Ill. 251, 87 N. E.
1011 (1909); Fox Film Corp. v. Collins, 236 Ill. App. 281 (1925); and State v.
Freeman, 143 Kan. 315, 55 P. (2d) 362 (1936).
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tutional law, Zechariah Chafee, Jr., has distinguished vividly
between "marketable" and "injurious" concepts and ideas.
He says:
. . . the normal criminal law is interested in preventing crimes and
certain non-criminal interference with governmental functions ...
It is directed primarily against actual injuries. Such injuries are us-
ually committed by acts, but the law also punishes a few classes of
words like obscenity, profanity, and gross libels upon individuals, be-
cause the very utterance of such words is considered to inflict a pres-
ent injury upon listeners, readers, or those defamed, or else to render
highly probable an immediate breach of the peace. This is a very
different matter from punishing words because they express ideas
which are thought to cause a future danger to the State . . . The
true explanation is that profanity and indecent talk and pictures, which
do not form an essential part of any exposition of ideas, have a
very slight social value as a step toward truth, which is clearly out-
weighed by the social interests in order, morality, the training of the
young, and the peace of mind of those who hear and see. Words of
this type offer little opportunity for the usual process of counter-argu-
ment. The harm is done as soon as they are communicated, or is
liable to follow almost immediately in the form of retaliatory violence.
The only sound explanation of the punishment of obscenity and pro-
fanity is that the words are criminal, not because of the ideas they
communicate, but like acts because of their immediate consequences
to the five senses. The man who swears in a street car is as much
of a nuisance as the man who smokes there. Insults are punished
like a threatening gesture, since they are liable to provoke a fight.
Adulterated candy is no more poisonous to children than some
books.
43
Following this thought, statutes and ordinances which
interdict conduct causing or calculated to cause a breach of
the peace, have been upheld by our courts as a valid exer-
cise of police power to protect life and to preserve good order,
public morals, and the general welfare of the people. In
prosecutions under such legislation, however, it is neces-
sary to prove that the conduct in the dissemination, sale or
distribution of the literature is not peaceable, but that the
conduct incites violence, or threatens immediate disturb-
ance of the peace, or tends to provoke others to break the
peace."
43 Free Speech in the United States (Harvard University Press, Cambridge,
Mass., 1941) 149.
44 Dearborn Pub. Co. v. Fitzgerald, 271 F. 479 (1921); Oney v. Oklahoma City,
120 F. (2d) 861 (1941); People v. Downer, 6 N. Y. S. (2d) 566 (1938); and State v.
Meredith, 197 S. C. 351, 15 S. E. (2d) 678 (1941).
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Thus, the ordinance involved in the case of Oney v. Okla-
homa City4 made it unlawful to "wilfully use, utter, pub-
lish, circulate or distribute any profane, violent, abusive or
insulting language, which language, in its common accepta-
tion, is calculated to cause a breach of the peace or an
assault."46 Plaintiff sought therein to enjoin the city officials
from enforcing the ordinance and from arresting and harass-
ing the plaintiff for distributing his publications. The trial
court held that since the ordinance was directed at the dis-
tribution of literature calculated to incite violence and dis-
turb the peace, the officials could not apply the ordinance to
the peaceable dissemination thereof. 47 In reversing the
lower court with directions to proceed further, the upper
court determined that such violations could only be deter-
mined after issues had been made up and a full hearing
had. It also stated:
Freedom of religion embraces two concepts, freedom to believe and
freedom to act. The first is absolute, but the second remains subject
to regulation for the protection of society. The City, under delegation
of authority from the state in the exercise of police power, may enact
ordinances to punish those who abuse these freedoms, to which we
have adverted, by utterances inimical to the public welfare, tending
to corrupt public morals, incite crime, or disturb the peace. 48
Though Mr. Justice Holmes had held that breach of the
peace meant words used "in such circumstances and
[which] are of such a nature as to create a clear and present
danger,''49 the courts have more recently widened the scope
thereof to embrace "words likely to cause an average
addressee to fight." 5  In Cantwell v. Connecticut,5  for
45 120 F. (2d) 861 (1941). 46 Ibid., at 862, note 5.
47 Stratton v. St. Louis S. W. R. Co., 284 U. S. 530. 52 S. Ct. 222, 76 L. Ed.
465 (1932); Spielman Motor Sales Co. v. Dodge, 295 U. S. 89, 55 S. Ct. 678, 79
L. Ed. 1322 (1935); Beal v. Missouri Pacific R. Corp., 312 U. S. 45, 61 S. Ct. 418,
85 L. Ed. 577 (1941); Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman, 312 U. S. 496, 61
S. Ct. 643, 85 L. Ed. 971 (1941); Watson v. Buck, 313 U. S. 387, 61 S. Ct. 962, 85
L. Ed. 1416 (1941); Watch Tower Bible & Tract Soc. v. City of Bristol, 24 F. Supp.
57 (1938), affirmed in 305 U. S. 572, 59 S. Ct. 246, 83 L. Ed. 36 (1938).
48 Oney v. Oklahoma City, 120 F. (2d) 861 at 865.
49 Schenck v. United States, 249 U. S. 47 at 52, 39 S. Ct. 247, 63 L. Ed. 471 at
473 (1919).
50 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U. S. 568 at 573, 62 S. Ct. 766, 86 L. Ed.
1031 at 1036 (1942). See also Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 60 S. Ct. 900,
84 L. Ed. 1213 (1940); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88, 60 S. Ct. 736, 84 L. Ed.
1093 (1940).
51 310 U. S. 296, 60 S. Ct. 900, 84 L. Ed. 1213 (1940).
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example, it was held that one may be guilty of a breach of
the peace if he commits acts or makes statements likely to
provoke violence and the disturbance of good order, even
though no such eventuality was intended; that resort to epi-
thets or personal abuse is not in any proper sense communi-
cation of information or opinion safeguarded by the Constitu-
tion, and punishment therefor, as a criminal act, would
raise no question under that instrument. The court therein
further stated:
The offence known as breach of the peace embraces a great variety
of conduct destroying or menacing public order and tranquility. It in-
cludes not only violent acts but acts and words likely to produce
violence in others. No one would have the hardihood to suggest that
the principle of freedom of speech sanctions incitement to riot or that
religious liberty connotes the privilege to exhort others to physical
attack upon those belonging to another sect. When clear and present
danger of riot, disorder, interference with traffic upon the public
streets, or other immediate threat to public safety, peace, or order,
appears, the power of the state to prevent or punish is obvious.5 2
In much the same way, Delk v. Commonwealth5 3
involved a minister of the gospel who was charged with
breach of the peace in using "obscene, vulgar and indecent
language" in the presence of an assembly of people, includ-
ing women and children. The court there defined breach of
the peace as including acts "tending to provoke or incite
others to break the peace." 54 In sustaining a conviction, the
court said:
The appellant's excuse that he was merely rebuking the sin of im-
purity, that he did not intend to disturb or embarrass any one, but
made the statement as a warning and rebuke to sin, is wholly with-
out justification. It does not avail appellant for him to say he has a
52 310 U. S. 296 at 308, 60 S. Ct. 900, 84-L. Ed. 1213 at 1220.
58 166 Ky. 39, 178 S. W. 1129 (1915).
54 The court quoted from 8 R. C. L., Criminal Law, § 305, p. 284, which reads:
"In general terms a breach of the peace is a violation of public order, a disturb-
ance of the public tranquility, by any act or conduct inciting to violence or tend-
ing to provoke or excite others to break the peace . . . It is not necessary that
the peace be actually broken to lay the foundation for a prosecution for this
offense. If what is done is unjustifiable and unlawful, tending with sufficient
directness to break the peace, no more is required. Nor is actual personal
violence an essential element in the offense. If it were, communities might be
kept in a constant state of turmoil, fear and anticipated danger from the
wicked language and conduct of a guilty party, not only destructive of the
peace of the citizens but of public morals without the commission of the offense.
The good sense and morality of the law forbid such a construction."
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right to propagate his religious views. That right is not denied; but
one will not be permitted to commit a breach of the peace, under
the guise of preaching the gospel. If one be licensed to use the pulpit
for such disgraceful performances as the appellant admits he was
guilty of in this case, then women and children are to be insulted
with impunity by the use of the most obscene vulgarity in places
where they go to worship.55
The Virginia and the Georgia courts have held that in
the prosecution for acts productive of or intending to pro-
duce a breach of the peace the truth of the word spoken was
no defense. 6 Nor can self-professed good motives give such
acts religious sanctity. The United States Supreme Court has
likewise declared that "the refusal of the state court to admit
evidence of provocation and evidence bearing on the truth or
falsity of the utterance is open to no constitutional objec-
tion. '57 So, too, in People v. Most,58 the defendant was con-
victed for endangering public peace through certain pub-
lished articles. The court held that actual breach of the
peace was not necessary because "public peace is in danger
when a breach thereof is likely to occur in the ordinary
course of events." 59
The United States Supreme Court has also recently sus-
tained the validity of a statute prohibiting any person from
addressing any offensive, derisive or annoying words to any
other person who is lawfully in the street, or calling him by
any offensive name.60 The appellant, in that case, was dis-
tributing literature of his sect on the streets while denounc-
ing all religion as a "racket." He was convicted for calling
the complainant offensive and derisive names and he raised
the question that the statute was invalid under the Four-
teenth Amendment in that it placed an unreasonable
.55 166 Ky. 39 at 47, 178 S. W. 1129 at 1132. In 34 A. L. R. 580 appears the state-
ment: "Where a local act prohibited the use of threatening, abusive, and insult-
ing words and behaviour in the streets whereby a breach of the peace might be
occasioned, and a Protestant lecturer had held meetings in public places, causing
large crowds to assemble and obstruct the streets, and in addressing those meet-
ings had used gestures and language which were highly insulting to the religion
of the Roman Catholic inhabitants, of whom there were many in the city, it was
held that he was properly required to give security to be of good behavior."
56 Byrd v. Commonwealth, 124 Va. 833, 98 S. E. 632 (1919); Dyer v. State, 99 Ga.
20, 25 S. E. 609 (1896).
57 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U. S. 568 at 574, 62 S. Ct. 766, 86 L. Ed.
1031 at 1036 (1942). 58 171 N. Y. 423, 64 N. E. 175 (1902).
59 171 N. Y. 423 at 430, 64 N. E. 175 at 178. 60 See note 57 ante.
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
restraint on freedom of speech, press and worship. The court
said:
And we cannot conceive that cursing a public official is the exercise
of religion in any sense of the term. But even if the activities of the
appellant which preceded the incident could be viewed as religious
in character, and therefore entitled to the protection of the Fourteenth
Amendment, they would not cloak him with immunity from the legal
consequences for concomitant acts committed in violation of a valid
criminal statute.61
After examining the statute and reasserting with even
greater emphasis than ever before that free speech was
never intended to be absolute, the Supreme Court proceeded
to decline protection for "fighting words" that are "likely to
cause a breach of the peace," saying:
The English language has a number of words and expressions which
by general consent are "fighting words" when said without a dis-
arming smile . . . Such words, as ordinary men know, are likely to
cause a fight. So are threatening, profane or obscene revilings. De-
risive and annoying words can be taken as coming within the pur-
view of the statute as heretofore interpreted only when they have
this characteristic of plainly tending to excite the addressee to a breach
of the peace . . . The statute, as construed, does no more than pro-
hibit the face-to-face words plainly likely to cause a breach of the
peace by the addressee, words whose speaking cause a breach of the
peace by the speaker-including "classical fighting words," words in
current use less "classical" but equally likely to cause violence, and
other disorderly words, including profanity, obscenity and threats . . .
A statute punishing verbal acts, carefully drawn so as not unduly to
impair liberty of expression, is not too vague for a criminal law. .... 62
The rule for construing similar statutes has been laid
down, in Gitlow v. New York, in the following words:
Every presumption is to be indulged in favor of the validity of the
statute . . . And the case is to be considered "in the light of the
principle that the state is primarily the judge of regulations required
in the interest of public safety and welfare"; and that its police "stat-
utes may only be declared unconstitutional where they are arbitrary
or unreasonable attempts to exercise authority vested in the state in
the public interest."
In Whitney v. California,4 the court held that a statute
meets the essential requirements of due process if it is suffi-
ciently explicit to inform those who are subject to it that
61 315 U. S. 568 at 571, 62 S. Ct. 766, 86 L. Ed. 1031 at 1035.
62 315 U. S. 568 at 573, 62 S. Ct. 766, 86 L. Ed. 1031 at 1036.
63 268 U. S. 652 at 668, 45 S. Ct. 625, 69 L. Ed. 1138 at 1148.
64 274 U. S. 357, 47 S. Ct. 641, 71 L. Ed. 1095 (1927).
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conduct on their part will render them liable to its penalties,
and if it be couched in terms that are not so vague that men
of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its mean-
ing and differ as to its application. It further held that a
statute is not class legislation if it affects all alike, no matter
what their purpose may be, who come within its terms and
do the things prohibited. 5
The opinion in Bevins v. Prindable66 is particularly
interesting because it involves an Illinois penal statute relat-
ing to the sale and exhibition of any lithograph, moving
picture, play, drama or sketch, which portray "depravity,
criminality, unchastity, or lack of virtue of a class of citizens
of any race, color, creed or religion . . . or which is produc-
tive of breach of the peace or riots." 7 In denying to the
complainant, a member of a religious cult, the use of injunc-
tive relief to restrain local officials from interfering with the
distribution of certain pamphlets," the court said:
In the view we take of the case under the evidence we do not find it
now necessary to consider the constitutionality of the statute. In pass-
ing, however, we do say that it is not clearly apparent that the stat-
ute in question is unconstitutional. Plaintiffs say it is vague and in-
definite. There is truth in the charge but the statute deals with a
type of offense that defies exact definitiveness. In that respect it is
similar to statutes creating the offense of criminal libel . . . This stat-
ute does not subject the plaintiffs to "previous restraint" such as re-
ceived the condemnation of the Supreme Court in Lovell v. Griffin
. . . Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization . . . Cantwell
v. Connecticut . . . and in Schneider v. State of New Jersey . .
It requires no license for seeking contributions or for distribution of
literature and no administrative censorship is provided. Until the stat-
ute has actually been violated or reasonable grounds exist for believ-
ing that the statute has been violated or that such violation is immi-
nent, there can be no proper official interference with the distribu-
tion of the literature and such interference must be limited to the
distribution of literature that offends the statute. It does not condemn
publication of all literature as did the ordinance condemned in Lovell
65 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 60 S. Ct. 900, 84 L. Ed. 1213 (1940):
Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88, 60 S. Ct. 736, 84 L. Ed. 1093 (1940).
66 39 F. Supp. 708 (1941), affirmed in 314 U. S. 573, 62 S. Ct. 116, 86 L. Ed. 465
(1941).
67 M. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 38, § 471.
68 These pamphlets assailed every religion, the Catholic religion in particular,
as a "racket," and referred to the robes of all priests as "uniforms of Fifth
Columnists" and "a license to commit crime with impunity."
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v. Griffin . . . but is limited to publications having the nature and
content described in the statute. 69
It should be kept in mind also that the words complained
of in the Bevins case were "fighting words likely to cause an
average addressee to fight,"7 or words "likely to provoke
violence or disturbance of good order even though no such
eventuality is intended. ' 71 The statute therein involved oper-
ated on all alike and did not interfere with any one's reli-
gious beliefs. 72 It prohibited merely the "profanity and inde-
cent talk and pictures" which do not form an essential part
of any exposition of ideas, things which have very slight
social value as a step toward truth, and which are clearly
outweighed by the social interests in order, morality, the
training of the young, and the peace of mind of those who
hear and see. Furthermore, the Illinois Constitution of 1870
specifically authorizes such legislation in that it provides
that liberty of conscience shall not "excuse acts of licen-
tiousness, or justify practices inconsistent with the peace or
safety of the state.
'73
In the light of what has been said, then, the penal statute
interpreted in the Bevins case becomes one of the most
effective legal weapons to combat vile and malicious attacks
upon citizens of any race, color, creed or religion. While the
prohibition in that statute relates to the sale and exhibition
of lithographs, moving pictures, plays, dramas or sketches,
without mentioning the use of printed words, the particular
act involved in the Bevins case was the sale and distribution
of pamphlets which tended to defame all Catholic priests.
It is perfectly obvious that members of a group may be as
effectively exposed to hatred and contempt by words as by
sketches and pictures, and undoubtedly the legislature
intended to prohibit all forms of publications which would
expose the citizens of any race, color, creed or religion to
hatred or obloquy.
The conduct prohibited by the statute is similar to the
69 39 F. Supp. 708 at 712.
70 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U. S. 568, 62 S. Ct. 766, 86 L. Ed. 1031
(1942).
71 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 60 S. Ct. 900, 84 L. Ed. 1213 (1940).
72 Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U. S. 569, 61 S. Ct. 762, 85 L. Ed. 1049 (1941).
73 IlM. Const. 1870, Art. II, § 3.
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offense of criminal libel, as defined in the Illinois statutes.74
The Supreme Court of Illinois applied this libel statute, in
People v. Spielman,75 to the defendants who had published
defamations of a group, to-wit: the American Legion.
The court held that the libel need not be of a particular
person, but that it may be against a family, class, corpora-
tion or other body. The court reasoned that "a libel upon a
class or group has as great a tendency to provoke a breach of
the peace or to disturb society as has a libel on an individual,
and such a libel is punishable even though its application to
individual members of the class or group cannot be proved. ,76
Neither of these two Illinois statutes deprive citizens of
any of their constitutional rights. They are aimed to check
only the distribution of false and defamatory publications.
The law is clear that the truth of the charge, when published
with good motive and for justifiable ends, is a good
defense. 77 Whether the charge be true or false, and whether
it be published with good motive and for justifiable ends are
questions of fact to be determined by a court or jury. So, like-
wise, is the question of whether the libel caused or tended to
provoke a breach of the peace. 78 A wholesome recourse to
such statutes could accomplish more than any licensing de-
vice, based on the dangerous theory that taxation is not an
interference with religious freedom.
From this analysis, the conclusion is inescapable that the
distribution and sale of indecent, profane, obscene, immoral,
abusive or libelous literature is illegal even when done under
the pretense of religion. It can not be defended on constitu-
tional grounds because "there is no theory upon which the
74 IM. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 38, § 402, reads: "A libel is a malicious defamation
expressed either by printing, or by signs or pictures, or the like, tending to
blacken the memory of one who is dead, or to impeach the honesty, integrity,
virtue or reputation, or publish the natural defects of one who is alive, and
thereby to expose him to public hatred, contempt, ridicule, or financial injury."
75 318 Il. 482, 149 N. E. 466 (1925).
76 318 Ill. 482 at 489, 149 N. E. 466 at 469. The court cited, in support there-
of: Rex v. Osborn, 2 Barn. K. B. 166, 94 Eng. Rep. 425 (1732); People v. Gordon,
63 Cal. App. 627, 219 P. 486 (1923); and State v. Brady, 44 Kan. 435, 24 P. 948, 9
L. R. A. 606 (1890).
77 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 38, § 404. See also Ogren v. Rockford Star Printing
Co., 288 Ill. 405, 123 N. E. 587 (1919).
78 See Oney v. Oklahoma City, 120 F. (2d) 861 (1941); 9 C. J., Breach of the
Peace, § 17, p. 392; and 48 A. L. R. 97.
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Constitution can be shaped into a mantle for wrong.""m The
Mormons pleaded with our courts that the outlawing of poly-
gamy would terminate religious freedom in America, but
the Supreme Court brushed such claim aside as a "sophisti-
cal plea."8 ° Objectors to military draft laws,8 l to the Eight-
eenth Amendment,82 to censorship of films and books, 3 to
pure food laws,84 to labor laws,8 5 to contagious disease re-
strictions,86  and to general health measures,8 7 have all
vainly insisted that such legislation abridged the Bill of
Rights and would destroy our freedom.
The right to circulate ideas, to express opinions, to
discuss all subjects of public concern and to fairly criticise,
no matter how distasteful, severe or abhorrent such criti-
cism may be, must never be tampered with in free America.
Things are, however, entirely different when dealing with
the abuse of that freedom by utterances injurious to society,
tending to corrupt public morals, incite to crime or disturb
the peace of the people. In the words of Mr. Justice Murphy:
There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech,
the prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to
raise any Constitutional problem. These include the lewd and obscene,
the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or "fighting" words-those
which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immedi-
ate breach of the peace. It has been well observed that such utter-
ances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of
such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may
be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in
order and morality. 88
The freedom such wrong-doers really seek to protect is
79 Swing v. American Federation of Labor, 372 Ill. 91 at 96, 22 N. E. (2d) 857
at 859 (1939).
80 Davis v. Beason, 133 U. S. 333, 10 S. Ct. 299, 33 L. Ed. 637 (1890).
81 Arver v. United States, 245 U. S. 366, 38 S. Ct. 159, 62 L. Ed. 349 (1918).
82 Ruppert v. Caffey, 251 U. S. 264, 40 S. Ct. 141, 64 L. Ed. 260 (1920).
83 Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Com., 236 U. S. 230, 35 S. Ct. 387, 59 L. Ed.
553 (1915); United States v. Motion P. Film "The Spirit of '76," 252 F. 946 (1917);
Goldstein v. United States, 258 F. 908 (1919); and Commonwealth v. Buckley, 200
Mass. 346, 86 N. E. 910 (1909).
84 United States v. 420 Sacks of Flour, 180 F. 518 (1910).
85 Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, 312 U. S. 287, 61 S. Ct.
552, 85 L. Ed. 836 (1941).
86 Peterson v. Widule, 157 Wis. 641, 147 N. W. 966 (1914).
87 People v. Byrne, 163 N. Y. S. 680 (1916); Streich v. Board of Education, 34
S. Dak. 169, 147 N. W. 779 (1914).
88 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U. S. 568 at 571, 62 S. Ct. 766, 86 L. Ed.
1031 at 1035.
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their own freedom to destroy the rights of others in the
pursuit of their evil designs. Theirs is a plea, not for liberty,
but for release from the responsibilities imposed by liberty.
That ill-conceived interpretation of liberty will not be sanc-
tioned by the courts. The courts can, and will, guard against
circumvention of lawful regulations.89 Liberty is the result
of intelligent and reciprocal adjustments to social, political
and economic development; it acknowledges reasonable
restraint upon the conduct of men who are prone to trespass
on the freedom of others. It was Socrates who said: "The
undisciplined life is not worth living." Regulatory law simply
demands the surrender by the people of some freedom as
their contribution to the general well-being of society.
It is not within the province or power of any American
court to pass upon the merits of any religion. Such function
would negate every democratic concept. When we realize,
however, that our country is being deluged with propaganda
bent on destroying true freedom of worship, it becomes
imperative upon courts to check those who so act. If "reli-
gious" convictions sanction injurious and illegal practices,
the courts must denounce actions based on such "religious"
convictions.
The argument advanced, usually by offenders, that courts
may not inject themselves into religious controversies is
based on the old dictum that truth ultimately triumphs over
persecution. It is one of those pleasant fallacies which
experience compels us to reject. Certainly it is true that the
concepts of truth and falsehood undergo changes from time
to time. In the words of Mr. Justice Holmes, "the ultimate
good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas,-
that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get
itself accepted in the competition of the market."90 But such
concepts refer to the honest and marketable ideas. They can-
not possibly give immunity for wicked, vicious and corrupt
assaults upon those who entertain other ideas or beliefs. The
89 Literature bearing matters of public interest on one side and advertising
matter on the other to evade the prohibition of a city ordinance forbidding dis-
tribution of commercial leaflets has been denied constitutional protectiorL See
Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U. S. 52, 62 S. Ct. 920, 86 L. Ed. 1262 (1942).
90 See dissenting opinion to Abrams v. United States, 250 U. S. 616 at 630, 40
S. Ct. 17, 63 L. Ed. 1173 at 1180 (1919).
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Supreme Court has, itself, expressly qualified these concepts
by saying: "Nothing we have said is intended even remotely
to imply that, under the cloak of religion, persons may, with
impunity, commit frauds upon the public."91 Courts cannot
intrude into the consciences of men or force them to believe
or think contrary to their convictions. But, as Mr. Justice
Reed said, ". . courts are competent to adjudge the acts
men do under color of a constitutional right. . . and to deter-
mine whether the claimed right is limited by other recog-
nized powers, equally precious to mankind. So the mind and
spirit of man remain forever free, while his actions rest
subject to necessary accommodation to the competing needs
of his fellows."'92
True freedom contemplates the pursuit of our own good
in our own way, so long as we do not attempt to deprive
others of their freedom or to impede their lawful efforts to
attain it. The authority of the state to prevent the abuse of
rights is the only real guarantee of liberty for all the people.
Nothing is more vital to the existence of liberty and the
survival of democracy.
91 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296 at 306, 60 S. Ct. 900, 84 L. Ed. 1213
at 1219.
92 Jones v. Opelika, 316 U. S. 584 at 594, 62 S. Ct. 1231, 86 L. Ed. 1691 at 1700.
